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Contracting as a Mechanism for Managing Education Services
Abstract
Contracting with for-profit firms is one of the new organizational arrangements to emerge in public education
in the nineties. Fueled by millions of new investment dollars and by demand for education management
services from the burgeoning charter school movement, education contracting is growing. The Edison
Project, for example, opened its first four schools in 1995 and now operates 77 schools serving approximately
37,000 students in twelve states. Contracting, like vouchers and charter schools, is a market-based reform
presumed to promote improved performance through new accountability mechanisms and exploiting
competition.
School districts have long contracted for building maintenance, transportation, and food services. Districts
have even contracted for educational services, but typically only for specialized services for a small number of
children with handicaps or other special needs. What is happening now is different: school districts are
contracting for regular educational services, the very services they are organized to provide.
This issue of CPRE Policy Briefs describes key features of education services contracts between school
districts and forprofit firms and discusses some management issues raised by these contracts. The information
is based on the terms of 11 contracts and interviews with the officials who shaped these contracts. The
contracts were intentionally selected to be diverse. They include contracts from 1990 to 1998 and contracts
with school districts as well as with charter boards. One contract established external management control of
an entire school district; other contracts focused on school-level management; while still others provided a
limited set of educational services. A few of the contracts ended contentiously; others have been in force for
some years without dispute. This Policy Brief does not evaluate particular contracts from an educational or
legal perspective, but uses the set of contracts to analyze contracting as a management tool in education.
Disciplines
Disability and Equity in Education | Educational Administration and Supervision | Education Economics |
Education Policy | Human Resources Management
Comments
View on the CPRE website.
This policy brief is available at ScholarlyCommons: http://repository.upenn.edu/cpre_policybriefs/15
Policy Briefs
CONSORTIUM FOR POLICY RESEARCH IN EDUCATION
University of Pennsylvania • Harvard University • Stanford University
University of Michigan • University of Wisconsin-Madison
Reporting on issues in education reform
Graduate School of Education         •         University of Pennsylvania         •         RB-28-November 1999
Contracting as a Mechanism for Managing
Education Services
by Jane Hannaway
The Consortium for Policy Research in Education (CPRE) studies alternative approaches to education reform in order to
determine how state and local policies can promote student learning.  Currently, CPRE’s work is focusing on accountability
policies, efforts to build capacity at various levels within the education system, methods of allocating resources and compensat-
ing teachers, and governance changes like charters and mayoral takeover.  The results of this research are shared with policymakers,
educators, and other interested individuals and organizations in order to promote improvements in policy design and implemen-
tation. CPRE is supported by the National Institute on Educational Governance, Finance, Policymaking and Management,
Office of Educational Research and Improvement, U.S. Department of Education.
Contracting with for-profit firms is one of the neworganizational arrangements to emerge in publiceducation in the nineties. Fueled by millions ofnew investment dollars and by demand for edu-
cation management services from the burgeoning charter
school movement, education contracting is growing. The
Edison Project, for example, opened its first four schools in
1995 and now operates 77 schools serving approximately
37,000 students in twelve states. Contracting, like vouchers
and charter schools, is a market-based reform presumed to
promote improved performance through new accountability
mechanisms and exploiting competition.
School districts have long contracted for building maintenance,
transportation, and food services. Districts have even con-
tracted for educational services, but typically only for spe-
cialized services for a small number of children with handi-
caps or other special needs. What is happening now is differ-
ent: school districts are contracting for regular educational
services, the very services they are organized to provide.
This issue of CPRE Policy Briefs describes key features of
education services contracts between school districts and for-
profit firms and discusses some management issues raised
by these contracts. The information is based on the terms of
11 contracts and interviews with the officials who shaped
these contracts.  The contracts were intentionally selected to
be diverse.  They include contracts from 1990 to 1998 and
contracts with school districts as well as with charter boards.
One contract established external management control of an
entire school district; other contracts focused on school-level
management; while still others provided a limited set of edu-
cational services. A few of the contracts ended contentiously;
others have been in force for some years without dispute.
This Policy Brief does not evaluate particular contracts from
an educational or legal perspective, but uses the set of con-
tracts to analyze contracting as a management tool in educa-
tion.
The 11 contracts are all with for-profit firms. Many issues
related to contracting with for-profit firms are relevant to
contracting with nonprofit organizations as well, but not all.
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A primary difference between for-profit and nonprofit firms
is the ability to raise capital. For-profit firms can turn to in-
vestors for investment capital; nonprofit firms must rely
largely on gifts and foundation grants.  This difference pro-
vides for-profit firms with a definite advantage in terms of
raising funds for development and expansion.  It also allows
them to provide financial inducements to school boards, as
discussed later.  For-profit firms, however, are disadvantaged
to the extent that their profit motive raises suspicions about
whether they are acting in the best interests of the schools
they manage. As in any collaboration, firms and school boards
both benefit to the extent that the working relationship is open
and trustful, and contracts can play an important role in es-
tablishing such a relationship.
Contracting for regular education services involves consid-
erable delegation of  responsibility for managing schools, but
states and school districts always retain ultimate responsibil-
ity.  Private contracting is not an abdication of public respon-
sibility; it is a management mechanism through which school
districts may, or may not, better attain their traditional goals.
By contracting, school districts simply decide to buy rather
than make. It is too early to determine whether private con-
tracting arrangements will yield improved student perfor-
mance, but it is not too early to examine the underlying struc-
ture of contracting as a management tool in education.
The first two sections of this brief define contracting and
identify common contract clauses. These clauses raise ques-
tions parties should consider before entering into a contract.
The next section addresses the possibilities and limitations of
contracting and is organized around three general issues em-
bedded in contract provisions—objectives, performance mea-
sures, and costs. Many issues that arise in educational con-
tracts are predictable from the sizable body of research on
contractual relationships between organizations. Certain char-
acteristics associated with education organizations, however,
make some contractual issues particularly noteworthy.  In
particular, problems associated with the identification and
measurement of educational performance make the devel-
opment of performance incentives difficult. For related rea-
sons, education contracts generally differ from everyday and
more ideal contracts. Accountability provisions, for example,
are probably less specific than might otherwise be expected.
The last section of the brief considers some implications sug-
gested by emerging educational contracting arrangements.
What is Contracting?
Contracting, for purposes of this analysis, is an agreement
undertaken by the governing board of a public school district
or charter school with an outside for-profit firm to deliver
certain educational services in return for certain payments.
Under the contract, the outside firm assumes a large role in
managing the education process and, to a significant degree,
becomes accountable for the results. The contract speci-
fies the responsibilities of the firm—say, providing textbooks
or computers or making other investments—and its range of
discretion, for example, authority over teachers. The con-
tract also specifies the responsibilities of the school district
and the effective duration of the contract.
Contracts are typically designed to provide strong incentives
for achieving desired results. For example, financial rewards
may be based on attainment of certain targets, say, a certain
fraction of students achieving passing grades on a particular
exam. Even when explicit performance incentives are not
stated in the contract, an understanding usually exists that
contract renewal depends on at least satisfactory perfor-
mance.
The terms of a contract define what the firm and the school
board are obligated to do and provide incentives for the
achievement of goals, so the design of the contract itself is
important for the success of the venture in a very basic way.
3A bad contract, like one where the objectives conflict or are
beyond the reasonable reach of either party, is unlikely to
lead to full attainment of expected benefits. It even may lead
to disputes, the costs of which may well offset any benefits
otherwise achieved. Under a good contract, both parties feel
they can adequately meet the objectives set forth so neither
party feels that the only way to benefit from the relationship
is by “gaming” the process.
Common Contract Clauses
Contracts for education or any other type of service gener-
ally include clauses that describe basic aspects of the rela-
tionship between the contracting parties.  We identify some
of the key clauses below.  While many of these seem obvi-
ously important, they are sometimes overlooked. The best
way to specify such terms is also not always clear. To an
important degree, the specification depends on the objectives
of the contracting parties, the risks each party is willing to
assume, and the amount of trust in the relationship, among
other factors.
Responsibilities and relationship of the contracting par-
ties. What is the school district or charter board expected to
do? For example, is the district expected to ensure a student
body of a particular size? What is the contractor expected to
do?  Is the contractor expected to provide a facility with
certain characteristics by a particular date? Who provides
the curriculum? Who recruits, hires, and fires the principal?
The teachers? Must the other party approve personnel deci-
sions? Who ensures compliance with state and local health,
safety, financial, and educational regulations?
Payment.  Should payment to the contractor be based on a
fee for services, on cost savings, on a particular performance
target, or on some combination of factors?
Duration.  What is the length of the contract? A short con-
tract, say of one year, may allow closer control over the con-
tractor, but the short horizon may also limit the contractor’s
level of commitment and investment in the service.  It may
also be too short a time for the contractor to feel reasonably
confident that results can be shown. In general, the longer
the contract period, the weaker the control, but the greater
the likelihood of contractor investment. Many of the con-
tracts analyzed for this brief covered five years.
Renewal. What are the terms for contract renewal? Will the
contract be renegotiated and renewed or will the contract be
awarded based on a new round of competitive proposals?
Assuming satisfactory performance, can the contract just be
extended?  How long before the end of the contract will a
renewal decision be made?
Performance and performance incentives.  Performance
is among the most difficult matters to determine in education
service contracts. It is difficult to define performance objec-
tives precisely, and measuring various elements of perfor-
mance is often problematic. As discussed further below, the
more narrowly objectives are defined, the easier it is to mea-
sure them and to establish effective performance controls.
The advantage of narrow specification, however, is its disad-
vantage as well. Does a school board really want a contrac-
tor who is focused only on a narrowly defined, precisely
measured set of objectives? What is left unspecified prob-
ably will not receive much attention.
Asset ownership.  Some contractors make large up-front
investments in the schools they manage. Edison pays the
expenses associated with wiring schools for computers, pro-
viding each student with a computer to use, and training teach-
ers. Some contractors also have become heavily involved in
the purchase or lease of facilities. Who owns these assets
(and liabilities) if the contractual relationship fall apart? This
was a matter of great concern in the Education Alternatives,
Inc. contract with the Hartford, Connecticut Board of Edu-
cation and resulted in an extended and costly court dispute.
Intellectual property.  Some contractors invest heavily in
developing a curriculum and curricular materials for the
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4Can the contracting school board share the curricular mate-
rials with other schools in the district? What happens when
the contract ends? Can the school continue to use the cur-
riculum if the contractor is no longer involved?
“No compete” clause.  Personnel is an area of control that
contractors generally guard closely.  Contractors may ex-
pend great effort in hiring and training school personnel. What
happens to the personnel when the contract is over? Can a
school board end a contract, but keep the staff that the con-
tractor recruited, hired, and trained? Some contractors guard
against this possibility by specifying in the contract that the
personnel hired by the contractor cannot be hired by the school
board for a set period, like a year, after the conclusion of the
contract period.
Termination agreements.  Contracts usually specify condi-
tions that are agreed upon by the parties as grounds for  ter-
mination. They are the conditions under which either party
would prefer not to be in the relationship, often conditions
that make it difficult for them to meet certain objectives.  For
example, Edison contracts specify that school board actions
that threaten the employment terms established by Edison
for teachers in Edison-operated schools are grounds for ter-
mination. Edison contracts also consider enrollment that falls
below a set minimum to be grounds for termination. A school
district might require a provision specifying that the private
firm’s going bankrupt is grounds for terminating a contract.
Violation of other aspects of the contractual agreement—for
example, use of a particular curriculum—might be grounds
for which one party or the other ends the contract. Early
Edison contracts (probably in an effort to overcome skeptics
and establish trust) provided school boards with a large es-
cape hatch, allowing termination of  the contract “without
cause.” Now that Edison has established a track record, its
later contracts are more specific about the cause for termi-
nation. The 1998 contract between the Pontiac, Michigan
Board of Education and the Edison Project L.P., for example,
specifies failure “to make reasonable progress toward stu-
dent achievement.” In addition to the conditions leading to
the end of a contract, termination clauses may also identify
the timing and terms of termination, such as the required
amount of notice or the obligation to complete a school year.
Arbitration.  There are always uncertainties surrounding a
contract and its implementation, and contract disputes are
usually costly to both parties.  For these reasons, many con-
tracts include clauses that specify procedures for settling dis-
putes between the parties without going to court. In the event
of a dispute, for example, each party might appoint two rep-
resentatives to participate in a conflict resolution process. If
such a process is unsuccessful, the parties might refer the
matter to the American Arbitration Association.
Contracting in Education:
Possibilities and Limitations
To understand the advantages and problematic aspects of
contracting for educational services, it is important to recog-
nize that all contracts are necessarily incomplete for at least
two reasons. First, contracts cannot anticipate all contingen-
cies. Circumstances change and all relevant conditions are
not under the control of the contracting parties. In contract-
ing with government agencies, for instance, political condi-
tions are generally germane, but they are often difficult to
predict or control.
Second, contracts must allow the contractor some discre-
tion. Outside contractors are engaged because school boards
presume the contractors have some capability to improve the
management and efficient operation of schools. Otherwise,
why enter into a contract? If a school board knew the nature
of all work demands and what actions to take in every situa-
tion, it would not need to engage outside  managers; the board
could just establish decision rules, standard procedures, and
enforcement mechanisms. Education managers are hired
partly because of uncertainty about what to do and how to do
it well. Still, uncertainty necessarily contributes to the incom-
pleteness of contracts and always leaves room for dispute.
Which party should bear the cost of unanticipated or unpre-
dictable contingencies? If there are extenuating circumstances
and the contractor does not meet performance targets, who
bears the cost?  It is well worth the effort for parties to think
through as many contingencies as possible, to determine the
importance of various objectives to each party, and to learn
from the contracting experiences of others.  Well-designed
contacts not only provide better incentives, but also reduce
the likelihood of costly disputes. Even the best preparation,
however, cannot prevent some level of incompleteness, a
condition of all contracts; some measure of trust is neces-
sary to seal the deal.
Education contracts, due to inherent difficulties associated
with specifying educational objectives and with measuring
educational performance, tend to have incompleteness or lim-
ited specificity in many key clauses, such as those covering
objectives, performance, and costs.  Below we discuss how
some of the contracts we analyzed handled these clauses.
5Objectives. The most important part of any contract formu-
lation, even more than bargaining over specific terms, is iden-
tifying clear objectives. The contract should clearly specify
what each party wants to achieve from the relationship. Some
of the 11 contracts reviewed for this analysis revealed some
confusion and ambivalence, especially on the part of school
districts. Uncertainty, especially about the primary objectives
of the contract, can lead to serious conflict over respective
responsibilities and level of effort during implementation.
The objectives of the 11 analyzed contracts fall into two ma-
jor areas: financial objectives and educational objectives.
These sets of objectives share an underlying efficiency pur-
pose—obtaining the best outcome for a given level of expen-
diture or minimizing the level of expenditure required to ob-
tain a given performance level. The analyzed contracts vary
greatly in the degree to which they stressed educational or
financial objectives. In some of the so-called educational
performance contracts, it is difficult to find the educational
purpose of the contract, even though that is the presumed
central purpose of the venture.
That financial objectives appear to dominate some contracts,
perhaps because they accurately reflect what some districts
hope to achieve. Cost reduction is the reason government
agencies usually cite for private contracting (Pack, 1989) and
that school districts give for contracting out transportation,
food services, and the like. It is difficult for many public enti-
ties, including school districts, to raise revenue. Most districts
must issue bonds to generate substantial new funds. Even
high-wealth districts are constrained by fixed costs, such as
personnel costs that are determined largely by union agree-
ments. The financial advantages of a contractual relationship
can be an important inducement if a district needs an influx
of funds to finance the wiring of  schools for computers or to
implement a reform effort.
Financial objectives are prominent in the Educational Alter-
natives, Inc. (EAI)1 contracts with the public school districts
in Baltimore, Maryland; Hartford, Connecticut; and Dade
County (serving greater Miami), Florida. The contract terms
reveal a clear expectation that the contractor would cut dis-
trict costs,  invest significant capital in the districts, and raise
additional funds for the district. “Revenue enhancement” is
an explicitly identified objective in the Baltimore contract and
an expectation of significant financial investment by EAI in
the Hartford school district was explicitly stated into its con-
tract with Hartford.
Contracts Analyzed
Educational Alternatives, Inc. with
Dade County School Board, Florida
(June, 1990)
Educational Alternatives, Inc. with
Baltimore City Public Schools, Maryland
(July, 1992)
Educational Alternatives, Inc. with
Board of Education of the City of
Hartford, Connecticut
(July, 1994)
Sylvan Learning Systems, Inc. with
Charleston County School District, South Carolina
(February, 1997)
Sylvan Learning Systems, Inc. with
School Board of the City of  Richmond, Virginia
(January, 1997)
Sylvan Learning Systems, Inc. with
St. Paul Public Schools, Minnesota
(August, 1995)
Edison Project, L.P. with Wichita Board of Education
United School District #259, Wichita, Kansas
(January, 1995)
Edison Project, L.P. with
Boston Renaissance Charter School, Inc.,
Massachusetts
(April, 1995)
Edison Project, L.P. with Board of Trustees of
Sherman Independent  School District, Texas
(April, 1996)
Alternative Public Schools, Inc. with
Wilkinsburg School District, Pennsylvania
(July, 1995)
Beacon Education Management with
Chelmsford Public Charter School Board of Trustees
(June, 1998)
6Educational Alternatives, Inc. is not alone in promising finan-
cial resources to school districts; other contractors provide
financial inducements as well. Edison expends about $1.5
million in capital improvements and staff development in ev-
ery school it operates. The Sylvan Learning Corporation, which
contracts with school districts to operate remedial programs,
upgrades—at an approximate cost of $60,000—each class-
room it uses.
Financial objectives are not a problem in themselves; indeed,
they are a definite advantage to resource-constrained school
districts. They no doubt also increase the commitment of the
firm to the venture.  Financial objectives can become a prob-
lem, however, to the extent that they create confusion about
what is most important in the contractual relationship. A con-
tract that sends mixed messages not only affects the behav-
ior and expectations of the contracting parties, but also how
the venture is viewed by others—such as teachers, unions,
and parents—who are not signatories to the agreement. Such
confusion may explain part of the conflict in the Educational
Alternatives, Inc. ventures in Baltimore and Hartford where
the contracts explicitly identified cost containment and cost
reduction as school district objectives. Given this kind of con-
tract language, any changes proposed by the contractor
aroused the suspicions of employee unions and parents.
Performance measures.  The establishment of performance
measures is a critical part of any contract. These measures
provide the basis for determining whether a contractor has
fulfilled contractual obligations and have implications for the
contractor’s compensation. When a contract specifies per-
formance incentives, performance measures are even more
important. What is measured and rewarded directs the focus
of the work effort covered by the contractual relationship.
The 11 analyzed contracts incorporate a wide range of edu-
cation performance measures. The Sylvan Learning Systems
contracts have by far the most specific performance mea-
sures; and only the Sylvan contracts establish performance-
based incentives based on direct educational performance
measures. Not surprisingly, the scope of work in the Sylvan
contracts is also the most narrowly defined and easiest to
measure. Sylvan Learning Systems provides remedial instruc-
tion in mathematics and reading; it does not assume respon-
sibility for the full instructional program or for managing
schools. Sylvan uses the achievement tests commonly em-
ployed by the districts as performance measures in its con-
tracts with these districts. Sylvan contracts specify and guar-
antee the amount of improvement expected of students who
complete the program; the firm provides, at not charge, addi-
tional instruction to students who complete the program and
do not meet specified growth in achievement. In short, there
is little uncertainty or ambiguity in the Sylvan contracts about
what services will be provided, what goals will be pursued,
the means of measurement, or the consequences of not meet-
ing performance goals. Such contracts are unlikely to lead to
disputes and provide clear benefits as a management tool.
The Sylvan model is what many people have in mind when
they think about contracting in education. But most educa-
tion contracts are far less specific. In general, the greater the
number and the more complex a contract’s objectives, the
less specific are the performance terms of the contract.
In contrast to the Sylvan contracts, the Edison contracts as-
sume full responsibility for a school’s management and edu-
cational operation. The objectives, therefore, are by defini-
tion multiple and complex. As contracting theory would pre-
dict under such circumstances, the Edison contracts gener-
ally do not establish precise performance targets or perfor-
SYLVAN guarantees that each student in
the SYLVAN program who receives the
required number of hours of direct
instruction will attain at least +2 NCEs
growth in that students primary subject
(reading or math) . . . NCE growth will be
measured by the appropriate subtest of
the MAT-7 . . . SYLVAN will, at no charge
or cost to CCSD, provide 12 hours of
primary subject instruction to each
student who does not attain the growth
guaranteed above . . . Sylvan-Charleston
contract excerpt (4, p. 5)
EAI has represented that it expects to
invest in the School System
approximately $14 million of capital ($2.6
million in technology lease payments)
during the first year of this Agreement,
and approximately $20 million in
technology and software over the term of
this Agreement, and has further
represented that it expects to incur $1.6
million in building improvements during
the first year of this agreement . . . The
Board has relied on these representations
as inducements to enter into this
Agreement . . .  EAI-Hartford contract
excerpt (4.6.1, p. 36 )
7mance incentives.  Edison “expects” its schools to promote
higher achievement than other comparable district schools,
but it does not guarantee it.  The contracts identify a number
of assessment instruments they will use to report student re-
sults, as well as other measures of performance including
parent and community engagement, parent and student satis-
faction, student attendance and motivation, and teacher sat-
isfaction.  Thus, they provide considerable performance in-
formation, but they do not specify how the various perfor-
mance indicators will be weighed in determining Edison’s
overall performance. There appears to be more risk for both
contractor and school district under the Edison contracts than
under the Sylvan contracts as well as perhaps more gain.
Less specific contracts require good faith on both sides. To
some extent, the Edison contracts are actually tipped in favor
of the school districts.  Though the contracts do not contain
specific performance targets, they give the school district the
right to determine whether Edison’s performance has been
satisfactory. The district, in effect, can assign whatever weight
it deems appropriate to different objectives. Edison is obli-
gated to provide multiple measures of student performance,
as well as assessments of parental satisfaction and other
matters, but it is the school district that decides if the
contractor’s overall performance is sufficient.
The Beacon (formerly Alternative Public Schools) contract
with the Chelmsford Charter School takes a different ap-
proach. Like the Sylvan contracts, the Beacon contract speci-
fies performance incentives, but the incentives are not based
on student academic performance. Instead, the charter
school’s board of trustees agrees to award a performance
bonus based on enrollment demand and a survey of parental
satisfaction. Beacon receives the bonus if parents rate the
school as excellent (a score of 3.25 or above on a 4.0 point
scale), or if applications to the school are 2.5 times greater
than available seats.
Contracts vary greatly in the amount of information they con-
tain about the education process. Beacon is educationally
agnostic and simply agrees to manage whatever education
program the (usually charter) school board wants. The Bea-
con contract specifies little about the education program. In
contrast, Edison has a well-defined curriculum and education
program clearly laid out as part of its contracts.  Edison con-
tracts also detail considerable information about student/
teacher ratios, the curriculum, professional development,  tech-
nology, and relationships with families.  This process detail
provides observable measures of contractor effort and is
important especially when performance measures are not
entirely clear.
Almost all contracts provide contractors some kind of con-
trol over personnel. Contractors apparently believe they can
yield higher performance if they control the selection, train-
ing, and assignment of personnel, particularly teaching per-
sonnel. Although some Sylvan sites use district teachers,
Sylvan usually employs its own personnel to provide instruc-
tional services. All teachers must follow the Sylvan curricu-
lum and other Sylvan workplace practices including, for ex-
ample, attendance at regular meetings, performance evalua-
tions, and dress codes.  When contracting with a district,
Edison uses district teachers, but its contracts reserve cer-
tain rights over teachers’ work. These include the right to
impose greater work demands on the typical teacher, includ-
ing longer days and school years, than the district does. In
exchange, Edison pays higher salaries, given teachers’ expe-
rience and education, than the school district. Edison con-
tracts also reserve the right to supervise, assign, evaluate,
and  return to the district any teachers whose performance
Edison considers unsatisfactory.
Education is a labor-intensive industry and labor is the con-
tractors’ largest cost category. Because contractors are in-
terested in both quality control and cost control, the most
serious disputes tend to concern personnel. Disputes over
control of personnel were the primary reasons that the Alter-
native Public Schools contract in Wilkinsburg, Pennsylvania
contract ended up in the courts. Education Alternatives, Inc.
claims district teachers resisted implementing the contractor’s
education program in Baltimore, Maryland; since this experi-
ence, the firm prefers contractual arrangements where it di-
rectly employs the teachers.
Costs.  Decisions to contract out education services are of-
ten based on costs: Is the cost of contracting out a service
more or less than the cost of providing the service?  Produc-
tion costs, those direct costs associated with running a school
are the most obvious costs. Other costs that must be consid-
ered include bargaining, opportunism, and political costs.2
Bargaining costs are related to the terms and conditions that
were sometimes unclear at the time of the initial contract.
Opportunism takes place when one party, acting in bad faith,
. . . Edison shall have the sole
responsibility and authority to determine
staffing levels, and to select, evaluate,
assign, discipline and tranfer personnel
consistent with federal and state laws,
rules and regulation . . . (Edison-Wichita,
11.1, p. 10)
8takes advantage of an uncertainty or contract loophole for its
own benefit.3  Political costs—for example, the extended
turmoil that may ensue from eliminating certain staff posi-
tions—are particularly relevant in the education sector.4
There is reasonable evidence that government contracting to
private firms does lower production costs for at least some
services (for example, Pack, 1989). But the other costs—
such as those associated with monitoring operations—all have
to be factored in when deciding whether it is worthwhile to
contract out educational services.
The experiences of some contractors and school districts
demonstrate the seriousness of these other costs. Alterna-
tive Public Schools, Inc. spent many months in court because
the teachers’ union challenged the personnel decisions the
firm had made in Wilkinsburg, Pennsylvania. In addition, the
local school board members who brought the outside firm
into the district lost their seats in the next election.
Educational Alternatives, Inc. faced a difficult situation in
Hartford when unanticipated district budget problems exerted
financial pressure on the contractor. The contractor believed
that these  pressures exceeded the terms of the contractual
agreement. Community hostility, due in part to reports that
the contractor would reduce costs by eliminating staff posi-
tions in the district,  complicated and appeared to render im-
possible any negotiations between the district and the con-
tractor to resolve the situation.
Having learned from such experiences, contractors now struc-
ture their relationships with schools to minimize or avoid some
of these other costs. More aware of the political and opera-
tional problems caused by union distrust, Edison now uses
district teachers, refuses to go into districts if there is any
threat that positions will be cut, and includes union represen-
tatives in discussions with the district from the start to ensure
that all concerns are on the table.5 Education Alternatives,
Inc. (now Tesseract), no doubt feeling burned by its experi-
ences, no longer contracts with school districts. And newer
firms just entering the market seem to be concentrating on
contractual arrangements with charter schools, rather than
contracting directly with school districts.
The costs of monitoring contracts for education services can
be significant because of inherent measurement difficulties
and because performance measures are available only peri-
odically. Reporting procedures can fulfill some of the moni-
toring function. Some contracts specify regular meetings with
the school board; others require quarterly written reports
containing particular types of information.  Some monitoring
can be informal. Parents perform some aspects of the moni-
toring function by collecting information about their children’s
daily experiences in school. Parents who actively choose the
school their children attend (such as a charter school) are
likely to monitor the school carefully and may be a good source
of informal information, although the reliability of this infor-
mation would need to be weighed in making important deci-
sions.
All these “other” costs affect both firms and school boards
and both parties need to take them into account when enter-
ing contractual relationships.
Implications
It is too early to tell if contracting out regular education ser-
vices has been or can be successful in promoting greater
student achievement. Good results have been reported (Edison
Project, 1997; 1999), but questions remain (American Fed-
eration of Teachers, 1998; Edison Project, 1998). Certain in-
structive patterns, however, emerge in the contracts analyzed
here.
Contracting out education management is probably not
the easy solution to establishing accountability for stu-
dent achievement that some may have thought. Explicit
performance-based incentives are not evident in education
management contracts for the most part, and where they are
evident, they are not always directly related to student per-
formance.  Still, in theory at least, anticipated competition
from other education management providers and interest in
establishing a reputation for reliable, good performance may
result in high levels of focus, effort, and performance by edu-
cation management contractors. In difficult-to-manage schools
the value of these firms may be especially high. The small
number of providers and limited specificity of education con-
tracts, however, also provide an opportunity for fly-by-night
firms, uninterested in the long-term benefits of building a good
reputation, to take advantage of the situation. So, contract
terms, especially those that describe the education services
and programs to be provided, are especially important. Ef-
fective monitoring by the school board is also important: the
clearer the board is about its objectives and priorities, the
more effective its monitoring is likely to be.
The value of contracting is likely to vary according to the
particular needs of the school board. New start-up char-
ter schools with little experience and expertise in operating
schools are likely to have higher demand for education man
9agement services. School districts with hard-to-manage
schools constitute another potential market for education
management services.  Management firms provide school
districts with a way to structure a new start for these difficult
schools by bringing in new staff, new curriculum, and techni-
cal support; by setting expectations and creating account-
ability mechanisms; and sometimes by providing additional
resources.
School boards having cost reduction as their primary
objective will probably not find education management
services a worthwhile alternative. Contracts provide the
legal backing for a working relationship, but they only par-
tially shield that relationship from outside influences. Public
schools, governed by elected and duly appointed officials and
financed with public revenues, are public institutions, and as
such, they command the interest of many individuals and
groups. Successful implementation of contract agreements
depends on the support, or at least acquiescence, of  parents,
teachers, unions, and other parties. Some of the contracts
analyzed here led to disputes with these groups and resulted
in unworkable situations that were costly to both sides.  Be-
fore entering into a contractual relationship, school boards
and outside firms should at least be sure that the general
environment is not hostile to the contract.
This analysis of 11 contracts with for-profit firms to provide
regular education services proves, once again, that there are
no easy answers to complex educational problems. As with
any serious solution, contracting requires careful consider-
ation and analysis.  For many districts and schools, contract-
ing may provide the structure and discipline necessary to
improve schools, especially schools that are hard to manage.
Experienced contractors are likely also to be valuable for
new start-up schools and for schools attempting to operate
fairly autonomously.  But the benefits of contracting will only
emerge in settings where both parties are aware of its many
contingencies and are committed to making the relationship
work.
End Notes
1. Educational Alternatives Inc. is now known as Tesseract.
2. See Williamson, 1975 for an extended discussion of these
costs.
3. This is more likely to happen when competition for a par-
ticular service is low.
4. See Globerman and Vining, 1996, for their discussion of
some political costs of government contracting for informa-
tion technology.
5. The statement of agreed-upon facts in recent Edison con-
tracts includes a statement of understanding that the teach-
ers and administrators unions are prepared to cooperate with
the venture. (Agreement between the Governing Board of
Area Cooperative Educational Services and the Edison
Project L.P. - 5/12/98)
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